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Liberal Principles
Karl R. Popper | |
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(1) | The state is a necessary evil:its powers are
not to be multiplied beyond what is necessary. It is easy to see that the state must be a constant danger, or (as I have ventured to call it) an evil, though a necessary one. For if the state is to fulfil its function, it must have more power at any rate than any single private citizen or public corporation; and although we might design institutions to minimize the danger that these powers will be misused, we can never eliminate the danger completely. On the contrary, it seems that most men will always have to pay for the protection of the state, not only in the form of taxes but even in the form of humiliation suffered, for example, at the hands of bullying officials. The thing is not to pay too heavily for it. |
| (2) | The difference between a democracy and a tyranny is that under a democracy the government can be got rid of without bloodshed; under a tyranny it cannot. |
| (3) | Democracy as such cannot confer any benefits upon the citizen and it should not be expected to do so. In fact democracy can do nothing - only the citizens of the democracy can act (including, of course, those citizens who comprise the government). Democracy provides no more than a framework within which the citizens may act in a more or less organised and coherent way. |
| (4) | We are democrats, not because the majority is always right, but because democratic traditions are the least evil ones of which we know. If the majority (or 'public opinion') decides in favour of tyranny a democrat need not therefore suppose that some fatal inconsistency in his views has been revealed. He will realize, rather, that the democratic tradition in his country was not strong enough. |
| (5) | Institutions
alone are always never sufficient if not tempered by traditions. Institutions
are ambivalent in the sense that, in the absence of a strong tradition, they also
may serve the opposite purpose to the one intended. For example, a parliamentary
opposition is, roughly speaking, supposed to prevent the majority from stealing
the taxpayer's money. But I well remember an affair in a south-east European country
which illustrates the ambivalence of this institution. There, the opposition shared
the spoils with the majority. |
| (6) | A Liberal utopia - that is, a state rationally designed on a tradition-less tabula rasa - is an impossibility. For the Liberal principle demands that the limitations to the freedom of each which are made necessary by social life should be minimized and equalized as much as possible (Kant). But how can we apply such an a priori principle in real life. Should we prevent a pianist from practicing, or prevent his neighbour from enjoying a quiet afternoon? All such problems can be solved in practice only by an appeal to existing traditions and customs and to traditional sense of justice; to common law, as it is called in Britain, and to an impartial judge's appreciation of equity. All laws, being universal principles, have to be interpreted in order to be applied; and an interpretation needs some principles of concrete practice, which can be supplied only by a living tradition. And this holds more especially for the highly abstract and universal principles of Liberalism. |
| (7) | Principles of Liberalism may be described as principles of assessing, and if necessary of modifying or changing, existing institutions, rather than of replacing existing institutions. One can express this also by saying that Liberalism is an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary creed (unless it is confronted by a tyrannical regime). |
| (8) | Among the traditions we must count as the most important is what we may call the 'moral framework' (corresponding to the institutional 'legal framework) of a society. This incorporates the society's traditional sense of justice or fairness, or the degree of moral sensitivity it has reached. This moral framework serves as the basis, which makes it possible to reach a fair or equitable compromise between conflicting interests where this is necessary. It is, of course, itself not unchangeable, but it changes comparatively slowly. Nothing is more dangerous than the destruction of this traditional framework. (Its destruction was consciously aimed at by Nazism.) In the end its destruction will lead to cynicism and nihilism, i.e. to the disregard and the dissolution of all human values. |
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The Liberal Theory of Free Discussion Freedom of thought, and
free discussion, are ultimate Liberal values which do not really need any further
justification. Nevertheless, they can also be justified pragmatically in terms
of the part they play in the search for truth. | |
| (a)
imagination (b) trial and error (c) the gradual discovery of our prejudices by way of (a), of (b), and of critical discussion. | |
| The Western rationalist tradition, which derives from the Greeks, is the tradition of critical discussion Πof examining and testing propositions or theories by attempting to refute them. This critical rational method must not be mistaken for a method of proof, that is to say for a method of finally establishing truth; nor is it a method which always secures agreement. Its value lies, rather, in the fact that participants in a discussion will, to some extent, change their minds, and part as wiser men. It is often asserted that discussion is only possible between people who have a common language and accept common basic assumptions. I think that this is a mistake. All that is needed is a readiness to learn from one's partner in the discussion, which includes a genuine wish to understand what he intends to say. If this readiness is there, the discussion will be the more fruitful the more the partners' backgrounds differ. Thus the value of a discussion depends largely upon the variety of the competing views. Had there been no Tower of Babel, we should invent it. The Liberal does not dream of a perfect consensus of opinion; he only hopes for the mutual fertilization of opinions, and theconsequent growth of ideas. Even when we solve a problem to universal satisfaction, we create, in solving it, many new problems over which we are bound to disagree. This is not to be regretted. Although the search for truth through free rational discussion is a public affair, it is not public opinion (whatever this may be) which results from it. Though public opinion may be influenced by science and may judge science, it is not the product of scientific discussion. But the tradition of rational discussion creates in the political field, the tradition of government by discussion, and with it the habit of listening to another point of view; the growth of a sense of justice; and the readiness to compromise. Our hope is thus that traditions, changing and developing under the influence of critical discussion and in response to the challenge of new problems, may replace much of what is usually called 'public opinion', and take over the functions which public opinion is supposed to fulfil. | |
| [From : Public Opinion and Liberal Principles in Conjectures and Refutations (London 1963)] | |
| Contents |
| Liberalism Minoo Masani |
| Liberal
Principles Karl R. Popper |
| Liberalism
and Democracy Karl-Herrmann Flach |
| The
Liberal Agenda for the 21st Century A Liberal International |
| The
Rule of Law C. Rajgopalachari |
| The
Evolution of the Liberal Idea Otto Von Lambsdorff |
| Liberalism in India
D. V. Gundappa |
| Basic
Liberal Values and their Relevance to India in the Current Context An ILG document |
| The
Social Market Economy An ILG document |
| The
Requirements of Social Justice An ILG document |
| Freedom of Expression
and the Right to Know An ILG document |
| Technology
and Human Development An ILG document |
| Active
Citizenship An ILG document |
| Liberal
Priorities for India in the 21st Century A P.E.E/FNSt document |
| The
Essence of Democracy - Not Majority Rule Minoo Masani |